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3 September 1974

SUBJ: APSA Cor zation o	ovention (Chicago) Panel on the Commission on the Organi- of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy	
to those attend	s a copy of the handout that made available ding the panel. Questions 15 and 16 relate to the agency, now whether the wording of the questions reflects ideas into the staff's list of recommendations for the commission.	2
deputy, Bill B the possible verthe 1976 elect enhancing the with their rep	ked with Peter Szanton, the Research Director, and his acchus. Bill indicated, in response to my question about alue of delaying the final report until a time closer to ions, that the Commission may see it in the interest of practical effects of their recommendations to move ahead ort (perhaps even on original schedule) and get it before ent. Peter felt that the research effort was moving along planned, so this may indeed be an option open to them.	
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interesting and thoughtful, but primarily concerned theoretical, even philosophical points. The attendance was relatively good, especially considering it was during the lunch hour between normal panel times.

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likely staff or commission positions. Graham's was easily the most

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The attached memo was sent to me by an OPR analyst who attended the Political Science convention in Chicago and talked with a number of Murphy Commission consultants. His observation in paragraph 3 is particularly interesting—especially since there is a good chance

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4:00 Kent Crane phoned. He wants the following information on a priority basis (by Tuesday).

1. An accepted definition of covert action.

A list of USIB Committees, subcommittees, members, and functions (exclude NRO but allude to the existence of a "sensitive committee" to make numbers accurate.

3. Documentation of Soviet and other Communist activity against the U.S. Has there been any reduction in Soviet activity? Give trends in the size and objectives of Soviet operations. Give figures on the number of Soviet and other Communists operating out of country. Discuss the degree and sophistication of the threat (i.e., tradecraft). Provide hypothetical examples (for publication) of covert action proving it is not just overthrowing governments.

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The Soviet and Eastern European Intelligence Services as a major arm of the respective Communist parties continue to regard the United States as the "Main Enemy." Neither detente nor a heightened interest in China has resulted in any dimunition of the scale of effort against the U.S. On the contrary, the last two years have witnessed an expanded recruitment campaign, coupled with a vigorous covert action effort.

25X1 the Soviet and Eastern European Intelligence and

Security Services see in detente with the United States both an added threat to the security of their regimes, and an opportunity and obligation to intensify intelligence collection and covert action activities against the U.S. The number of Soviet and Eastern European intelligence operatives stationed abroad is well over 5,000. These operatives are highly trained professionals who, for the most part, are willing to use the most crude or sophisticated tradecraft necessary to subvert or recruit American nationals. An excellent insight into their methods, is afforded by the KGB training manual entitled "The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries", an accurate summary translation of which was published in John Barron's "KGB". (Appendix C, p. 346).

In intelligence collection top priority continues to be given to the acquisition of information on U.S. strategic military capabilities and intentions, scientific

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development and diplomatic and political policy. Covert action continues to play a major role in the promotion of USSR policy, impeding U.S goals and interests while at the same time bolstering the Soviets, particularly those that are less moderate than their official policy. The form and substance of their action is varied. It extends from massive covert support to Communist parties in key countries to subsidy of individual "agents of influence." A variety of international bodies with a cause are the witting or unwitting recipient of Soviet aid and control.

Covert action involves foreign propaganda, political and counterinsurgency actions conducted abroad in response to instructions from appropriate U.S. policymakers in support of U.S. policy, but not officially attributable to the U.S. Government.

In most instances, these actions are undertaken at the request and/or knowledge of appropriate foreign governments or established institutions of the countries concerned.

December 19, 1974

Mr. Fisher Howe
Commission on the Organization
of Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Fisher:

In addition to the several changes we discussed yesterday in Tom Reckford's draft on the clandestine services, I believe we should add some comments about the need for providing improved cover for CIA officers abroad. You will recall the chairman and members of the subcommittee agreed with Mr. Colby that current arrangements were inadequate and that exposure of operations officers abroad could lead to kidnappings and possibly assassinations. I believe the Commissioners felt strongly about that problem and it should be worked into our draft.

Sincerely,

bcc: Kent B. Crane

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